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Response Overview
RFI closed end of May 2009	 Honeywell, MN
Over 20 responses received	
Zona Technologies, AZ
Good cross-section of community
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F-18 IRAC RFI Response Summary
Key Technologies /Areas of Interest
– Integrated engine/aero surface control
– Adverse pilot/controller interactions
– Structures /structural modes
– Metrics for evaluating adaptive controllers
– Methods for V&V of adaptive systems
– New analysis techniques for adaptive control
– Autonomous vs. semi-autonomous recovery
– Integrated adaptive inner- and outer-loops
– Adaptive control in redundant architectures
– Recovery from unusual flight conditions
(7 responses)
(7 responses)
(6 responses)
(5 responses)
(5 responses)
(5 responses)
(4 responses)
(3 responses)
(3 responses)
(2 responses)
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F-18 IRAC RFI Response Summary
Other Interesting Comments
•Adaptive control should be integrated with a baseline controller and
only used when necessary (5 responses)
• Implementation as an emergency system
– Immediately re-stabilize and return to controlled flight
•Forced perturbation (excitation) for fine-tuning system
– Check margins
– Develop requirements for amplitude of excitation
•Adaptive system can improve performance by eating into margin
constraints imposed on the non-adaptive system
•Nonlinear effects due to multi-string voting
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F-18 IRAC RFI Response Summary
Other Interesting Comments
• It may be difficult to convince the aerospace community that results
from a military fighter testbed are applicable to transport aircraft
•Lesson learned from VISTA: modifications to the functionality of the
aircraft are doubly expensive due to the cost of recertification
•Evaluation metrics should include complexity of V&V and
implementation
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Verification and Validation
• “The usual elephant in the room is how to provide an
airworthiness certification for an adaptive controller.”
• Need for simplified adaptive system
– Contrary to the “publish or perish” mindset
• Use augmentative control approach rather than full-scale
substitution
• Monitor that assumptions used in stability proof remain
valid
– “Validation will have to include ensuring all the
assumptions that adaptive guarantees are based on
are in-fact met”
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Obstacles	 ; ^ ,
• “shortage of engineers with relevant adaptive control
knowledge and experience”
• “scarcity of flight experiments using realistic platforms”
• Nonlinear time varying system
• Need Guaranteed Performance Adaptive Controllers
• Need meaningful performance objectives
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Thanks for the very good feedback
This process will provide ahigh-payoff, high-quality flight
experiment
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Full-Scale Flight Experiment
	 r
Validate or Invalidate the “Imagined” problems
– Those issues that can’t be convincingly answered in simulation
or subscale testing
“Real” world effects
– Turbulence, gusts, wake encounter, etc.
– Real sensor characteristics
– Static structural constraints
– Aeroservoelastic constraints
– Interaction with pilot
• Seat-of-the-pants feedback
• High gain handling tasks
– Aerodynamic uncertainties
Added credibility for the methods that show the most promise•
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Adaptive Control Integrated with
Static Structural Constraints
• “The Super Hornet, even more than it’s predecessor, has incorporated a
number of tradeoffs between flying qualities and keeping structural loads in
the box.”
• Potential Experiments
– Control within structural constraints
• Ex: Fly same maneuver while reducing twist on one wing
– Fiber optic shape sensors as “pain feedback”
– Reconfigurable retrofit –drive adaptation through existing pilot input
paths
– LIDAR for gust load alleviation, wind shear /wake encounter mitigation
• Pluses
– F-18 has real loads constraints
– Much more tolerant to unexpected excursions
– Highly instrumented for loads
• Concerns
– Not a civil transport
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Adaptive Control Integrated with
Propulsion Control
Potential Experiments
– Slow responding effector integrated with faster aerodynamic control
– Modify FADEC for
• Quicker engine response mode for emergencies
• Pluses
– Many controls including throttles that can be rate limited
– Biggest benefit of adaptive control of engines is performance
(economics) not safety (dual use)
Concerns
– Close coupled placement of engines
– Changes to FADEC would be expensive
– Lot of previous work done –are
 there really fundamental questions
remaining?
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Adaptive Control Integrated with	 ^"-r ^^aAeroservoelastic Constraints
	 ^
• Potential Experiments
– Spatial sensing to eliminate structural modes from rigid body
– Self-tuning notch filters
– Study effect of interaction with high-gain adaptation
• Pluses
– Existing notch filters could be faded out
• Easy fail-safe reversion (turn filters back on)
– Not immediately catestrophic
– Very hard to model and accurately predict (makes good flight
experiment)
– Would provide much needed ASE model validation
– Enabling technology for lighter structures
• Concerns
– More sensors more potential failure modes
– Need to manage the phase loss effect on rigid body control
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Adaptive Control Integrated with	 r
Pilot Interaction	 -
“at a very minimum the flight crew must be aware of the current state of the adaptive
controller”
Potential Experiments
– Changing stick characteristics to inform pilot of degraded achievable performance
– Provide gentile autopilot function that is can safely guide an extremely damaged
vehicle (within very tight maneuvering constraints)
– Develop pilot cues for remaining control authority
– Develop emergency response and recovery system
• “needs to be minimally invasive and take action only in the most dangerous
circumstances when otherwise there would have been loss of control and
eventual crash”
– Investigate effect of an adaptive control system interacting with another adaptive
system
• Pluses
– Difficult to fully validate in simulation (makes good flight experiment)
– Good handling qualities tasks
• Air-to-air tracking
• Formation flight
Concern: Civil transport pilot interactions might be significantly different
•
•
•
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Adaptive Control Integrated with
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Your Thoughts?
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